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INTRODUCTION 
The human body is a limited resource that depletes over time. In 
our increasingly technological age, the wonders of modern medicine 
have come to include reliance on medical devices that assist and sustain 
the human body. These devices extend the amount of resources we have 
to rely on when the human form fails. However, with our increased 
reliance on medical devices, new problems have arisen regarding the 
extent to which these devices should be regulated and monitored. Current 
government regulation by the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
serves as a rubber stamp endorsing the medical device as a safe product. 
This policy has created a conflict within the legal system where a “safe” 
medical device causes injury to a consumer in need. Traditionally, where 
medical error by the human hand or judgment causes harm, those injured 
are provided recourse in the law through common law tort claims and 
medical malpractice statutes. However, the advent of medical devices 
supplementing the human hand where it can no longer aid coupled with 
the broad regulatory scheme surrounding such devices leaves the 
question of whether persons injured by medical devices will have the 
same recourse under the law. 
The legal system has not provided a solution to the problem of 
whether or not a person can sue under state common law tort principles 
for injuries caused by a medical device. The issue occurs due to the 
Federal Drug Administration’s regulation of the safety and effectiveness 
of medical devices. The FDA is responsible for regulating and 
supervising medical devices used for medical care. The statute detailing 
the extent of the FDA’s regulation of medical devices includes an 
express preemption clause, which has caused great controversy in its 
interpretation. The circuit courts as well as the Supreme Court have 
reviewed the FDA preemption clause and the tension it creates with state 
common law tort claims. This comment focuses specifically on the most 
important and certainly the most dangerous class of medical devices, 
Class III. In addition, this comment discusses the circuit court decisions 
that have split over the issue of whether persons have a right of action 
against device manufacturers in light of an express preemption clause 
forbidding state law claims that impose different requirements than the 
FDA. 
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Traditionally, state common law tort claims provide recourse from 
injury caused by negligence and defective products resulting from a 
defective design, a manufacturing defect, or a failure to warn. In the 
context of medical devices, such claims might conflict with the FDA’s 
determination that the device was safe for human use. For example, a 
prevailing judgment against a pacemaker manufacturer for negligent 
design appears contradictory to the FDA’s approval of the pacemaker as 
safe for human use. The argument for federal preemption of state law 
claims follows from the conflict between FDA requirements and 
common law tort judgments against the manufacturer that conflict with 
the FDA’s requirements for the device. The argument against preemption 
counters that adverse judgments in common law tort claims would not 
conflict with the FDA requirements, because they impose parallel 
requirements. If the medical device is defective, persons who are harmed 
should have recourse in the law. Both arguments hinge on the definition 
of different “requirements” with respect to FDA regulation. 
This comment provides a summary of the FDA’s regulation of 
medical devices and the circuit split over the scope of the express 
preemption clause prohibiting states from imposing any requirement that 
is either different from or in addition to a specific federal regulation.1 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr has left the 
circuit courts without a clear test to apply with respect to the FDA’s 
regulation of Class III medical devices.2 The extent to which FDA 
regulation preempts state common law claims has been a source of 
frustration for both the circuit courts and the plaintiffs who wish to 
litigate such claims. This comment will advocate a more coherent 
approach to the issue. By applying the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, this comment clarifies the scope of 
preemption that should apply when the FDA approves a device through 
the premarket approval process.3 This comment provides a new test 
through which circuit courts should reevaluate their stance on 
preemption. Furthermore, this comment will discuss the impact of the 
Bates decision and present a new framework to guide future circuit court 
decisions. This new approach will allow state common law claims that 
parallel federal safety and effectiveness requirements. 
Part I provides a basic overview of the Medical Device 
Amendments and the FDA, particularly the express preemption clause 
that has been the source of the circuit split.  This section provides a brief 
overview of the purpose of the FDA’s regulation in the area of medical 
                                                                                                             
 1 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
 2 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 3 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005). 
234 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:231 
devices and details the different categories and classes of medical 
devices. Part I also describes the premarket approval process and 
discusses the express preemption clause contained within the Medical 
Device Amendments. This section provides an overview of the principle 
statutes and medical device classifications that are essential for an 
informed reading of later sections. 
Part II provides a summary of the controlling circuit court decisions 
that have established the scope of the MDA’s preemptive effect over 
state tort claims. This section is the most comprehensive part of the 
comment. It serves as a general survey, which provides the basic facts, 
reasoning, and outcome of each relevant circuit court decision. This 
section divides the circuit court decisions into three categories according 
to the courts’ common analyses of the issue. The contrast among the 
three categories of circuit court decisions illustrates the expansive nature 
of the circuit split as well as the need for a uniform test. 
Part III summarizes the recent Supreme Court decision in Bates v. 
Dow Agrosciences and recommends a solution to the circuit split. This 
comment provides a new test which applies the Bates decision to the 
FDA premarket approval process, despite the failure of the Supreme 
Court to directly address the issue.4 The new framework suggests a 
“parallel requirements” test that circuit courts should apply to determine 
the scope of preemption with respect to the common law tort claim. Part 
III urges courts to look to the intent of the Medical Device Amendments 
and Congress in enacting the express preemption clause and apply the 
“parallel requirements” test. This section further discusses some of the 
concerns related to allowing tort claims of negligence to be brought 
against device manufacturers. The comment concludes by advocating the 
imposition of the new “parallel requirements” test as suggested by the 
Bates decision. 
I. THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENT AND THE EXPRESS PREEMPTION 
PROVISION 
The Federal Drug Administration is entrusted with a great amount 
of responsibility as the governmental regulator of the current health care 
system in the United States. The role of the FDA has continued to grow 
to the point where its role as a regulator affects every single person living 
in the United States; however, the FDA’s duties extend far beyond the 
scope of this comment. The FDA is both respected and criticized by the 
public and corporations alike. It continues to be a gatekeeper for products 
entering the medical market. However, in its role as a gatekeeper, 
                                                                                                             
 4 Id. 
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conflicts have arisen regarding the protection of the products and the 
companies that have passed through its gates. 
The FDA acts as the ultimate gatekeeper with respect to medical 
devices, forbidding use of devices that have failed to meet its approval. 
Such devices are regulated according to a comprehensive statutory 
scheme that was enacted over thirty years ago. In response to concern in 
the 1970’s relating to medical devices that were unregulated, Congress 
passed the Medical Device Amendment of 1976 (“MDA”) and created a 
broad regulatory scheme providing for medical device review and 
classification.5  A basic understanding of the definition of medical 
devices and their classifications is necessary in order to understand the 
extent of the legal analysis of this comment. 
A. Classification of Medical Devices 
Medical devices exclude drugs, but include the devices that 
diagnose human illness and devices used to cure or improve illnesses and 
disabilities.6 Some medical devices are more extensive in composition 
than others; some devices are made from one singular part and others 
require many moving parts working together. The difference between a 
plastic bandage and an implanted pacemaker requires the FDA to 
separately regulate the different devices into classes according to their 
complexity and their risk to humans. The FDA divides medical devices 
into three classes under the MDA.7 
                                                                                                             
 5 For a well-summarized background of the history of FDA regulation and 
congressional action see Sasha B. Rieders, Note, State Law Tort Claims and the FDA: 
Proposing a Consumer-oriented Prescription in Medical Device Cases, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1159 (2004). 
 6 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006). The statute explains that  
[t]he term “device” (except when used in paragraph (n) of this section and in 
sections 331(i), 343(f), 352(c), and 362(c) of this title) means an instrument, 
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or 
other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, 
which is – (1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United 
States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them, (2) intended for use in the 
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3) intended 
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, 
and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical 
action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not 
dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary 
intended purposes. 
Id. 
 7 See Gregory J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully, Express Preemption and Premarket  
Approval under the Medical Device Amendments, 59 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 245 (2004) 
(“Class I Devices-devices that ‘present minimal potential for harm to the user.’ For 
example, elastic bandages are classified as Class I devices. Class II Devices-devices that 
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Class I devices are those subject to general controls that “are 
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness 
of the device.”8 Only general controls are necessary with respect to Class 
I devices because these devices have a relatively low risk factor for 
human use. Additionally, a Class I device is one that the FDA deems 
relatively safe although the FDA cannot determine how much control the 
device should receive. 9 A device will be categorized in Class I, even if 
the effects of its use are unknown, so long as the intended use of the 
device does not greatly impact human health and its foreseeable use 
would not be dangerous to human health.10 
Class I medical devices are usually simple in design and 
execution.11 These devices are not subject to strict controls because their 
use presents the least amount of risk to the consumer.12 Device 
manufacturers of Class I devices are subject to general administrative 
controls including registration of the device and record keeping.13 
However, if the device is ever found to be dangerous or cause harm, the 
manufacturer is required to notify the FDA.14 The manufacturer of a 
Class I device must also comply with requirements that the device be 
sanitary and include accurate product labeling, which does not mislead 
the consumer.15 Common examples of Class I devices include plastic 
                                                                                                             
pose a greater risk of harm than those in Class I, but less risk than those in Class III. 
Class II devices include items such as some home pregnancy tests. Class III Devices-
devices that sustain or support life, are implanted, or present a potential unreasonable risk 
of illness or injury. Class III devices also include some lower-risk products that lack 
predicates. Class III devices represent approximately ten percent of the medical devices 
on the market. Examples of Class III devices include pacemakers and breast implants.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 8 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i)(2006). 
 9 Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii). The statute states that  
[a] device for which insufficient information exists to determine that the 
controls referred to in clause (i) are sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device or to establish special 
controls to provide such assurance, but because it—(I) is not purported or 
represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a 
use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human 
health, and (II) does not present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or 
injury, is to be regulated by the controls referred to in clause(i). 
Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, 
Device Advice, Device Classes, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3132.html (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
 12 Id. 
 13 21 U.S.C. § 360(f)-(j). 
 14 Id. 
 15 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-52 (2006). 
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bandages, examination gloves, and certain types of hand-held surgical 
instruments.16 
Class II devices include devices where the general controls are 
insufficient to maintain safe use of the product and additional restrictions 
and control are imposed on certain devices by the FDA.17 Class II 
devices include electronic wheelchairs, infusion pumps, and surgical 
drapes.18 Specific Class II medical devices may be exempt from 
additional controls where the FDA feels “these exemptions will relieve 
manufacturers from the need to submit premarket notification 
submissions for these devices and will enable the FDA to redirect the 
resources that would be spent on reviewing such submissions to more 
significant public health issues.”19 Class II devices separate generally 
harmless devices, listed in Class I, and Class III devices, which represent 
a risk of significant harm. These “more significant public health issues” 
are reflected in the FDA’s concern over the classification of Class III 
medical devices.20 
A Class III medical device is a device that requires more stringent 
controls imposed by the FDA due to the risk associated with the device 
and its use in maintaining human life. The statute defines a Class III 
medical device as one that plays such an important role in “supporting or 
sustaining human life” or is unreasonably dangerous that it requires 
substantially more control than required by Class I and II devices.21 
Common examples of Class III medical devices include laser eye surgery 
equipment, pacemakers, replacement heart valves and breast implants.22 
Consumers who seek the aid of Class III medical devices generally have 
a substantial need for the product to maintain their quality of life. Often 
times, people rely on these devices to support their existence in this 
world. The FDA provides an electronic database through which 
consumers and companies alike can search for Class III medical 
                                                                                                             
 16 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, 
Device Advice, Device Classes, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3132.html (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
 17 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 18 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, 
Device Advice, Device Classes, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3132.html (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2006). 
 19 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, 
Device Advice, Medical Device 510(k) and Good Manufacturing Practice Exemptions 
list, FDA website, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
 20 Id. 
 21 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). 
 22 See Scandaglia & Tully, supra note 7. 
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devices.23 Class III medical devices are marketable only after passing 
either the “premarket notification” (“PMN”) or “premarket approval 
process” (“PMA”).24 The PMN and the PMA represent more stringent 
controls that correspond to the high stakes intrinsic to use of Class III 
medical devices. 
The PMA process has been described as “rigorous,” requiring 
extensive submissions, time, and expense on behalf of device 
manufacturers in order to market a Class III device to the public.25 The 
goal behind this process requires the manufacturer of the device to 
“provide the FDA with a ‘reasonable assurance’ that the device is both 
safe and effective.”26 The PMA application submitted by the 
manufacturer requires that the manufacturer of the device have 
undertaken numerous scientific studies, including non-clinical laboratory 
studies and clinical investigations.27 Where a Class III device was 
approved by the FDA through the PMA process, this comment answers 
the lingering question of whether injured consumers may bring common 
law tort claims against the device’s manufacturer. 
The success of PMA process, in assuring the safety of medical 
devices, has been subject to great debate and Congress has acted with 
                                                                                                             
 23 Device product classifications can be found by searching the Product 
Classification Database, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPCD/ 
classification.cfm. The database search provides the name of the device, classification, 
and a link to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), if any. The CFR provides the device 
type name, identification of the device, and classification information.”  U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Device Advice, 
Overview-When a PMA is Required, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/pma/ (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2006). 
 24 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e(b). The PMN process is also known as the “§ 
510(k) process” and provides for approval of a device, without undergoing the more 
extensive PMA. Id. The FDA must determine that the device is “substantially equivalent” 
to a device that was in existence before the MDA. Id. The PMN process acts similar to a 
rubber stamp on a medical device that has a substantial equivalent already functioning in 
the market. Id. The PMN process is far less extensive than the PMA approval process. Id. 
The court in Medtronic held that a device that undergoes the PMN process and 
subsequently causes injury to a consumer will not enjoy preemptive protection from state 
common law tort claims. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996). The scope of 
this holding has created a division in the courts of appeals. Although the majority of the 
circuit courts apply Medtronic to hold devices approved under the PMA process to a 
higher standard and find preemption, the Supreme Court failed to comment on the issue, 
hence the nature of this note. See id. 
 25 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477. 
 26 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)). “PMA approval is based on a determination by 
FDA that the PMA contains sufficient valid scientific evidence to assure that the device is 
safe and effective for its intended use(s).”  U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center 
for Devices and Radiological Health, Device Advice, Overview-Introduction, 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/pma/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2006). 
 27 See 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2006). 
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respect to the process’s efficiency. Congress enacted the Safe Medical 
Devices Act of 1990 due to concern over the way medical devices were 
being approved under the PMA process.28 Additionally, Congress passed 
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 in order “to ensure the timely 
availability of safe and effective new products that will benefit the public 
and to ensure that our Nation continues to lead the world in new product 
innovation and development.”29 The FDA issued a statement of guidance 
regarding the FDA Modernization Act urging a more streamlined and 
“least burdensome approach” for future regulation. The ideal goal of the 
least burdensome approach when applied to premarket approval would 
be a reduction in regulatory burden and industry resources, all the while 
maintaining the safety of the public.30 Still, it is unlikely that the FDA 
can maintain an effective PMA approval process by applying the least 
burdensome approach given the increased demands on the FDA and 
consumer reliance on medical devices. In fact, the FDA’s PMA process 
can easily be described as burdened itself. 
The overview of the PMA approval process for Class III medical 
devices should provide an idea of the difficult and tedious effort required 
to offer medical devices to the public. Given the great responsibility and 
duty of the FDA in governing the medical devices on the market, the 
legislature has afforded the FDA protection in the form of an express 
preemption clause.31  The exact scope of the express preemption clause 
as applied to the FDA’s use of the PMA process has been the subject of 
great debate, with courts finding on both ends of the spectrum. Thus, a 
brief summary of the meaning of preemption and its application is 
necessary in order to set the context by which courts have argued to limit 
state common law tort claims. 
B. Express Preemption and the Circuit Splits 
Preemption of state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause, 
which states that the “[l]aws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
                                                                                                             
 28 The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 4(a), 104 Stat. 
4511, 4515 (1990) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006)). 
 29 S. REP. NO. 105-43 (1997), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?report= 
sr043&dbname=105& (last visited Oct. 29, 2006). 
 30 The Least Burdensome Provisions of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997: 
Concept and Principles; Final Guidance for FDA and Industry, 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1332.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2006). But see 
Goodlin v. Medtronic, 167 F.3d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he entire purpose of the 
PMA process is for the FDA to obtain a ‘reasonable assurance’ that the device is safe and 
effective.”) 
 31 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
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Law of the Land.”32 Therefore, “state law that conflicts with federal law 
is ‘without effect.’”33 As the Supreme Court held in Medtronic v. Lohr: 
In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which 
Congress has “legislated . . . in a field which the States have 
traditionally occupied,” we “start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by 
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”34 
Where a statute such as the MDA contains an express preemption clause 
the “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the 
plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence 
of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” 35 
The MDA includes an express preemption clause, codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 360k, which outlines the situations where federal law surpasses 
state law with respect to FDA medical device regulation.36 The FDA’s 
interpretation of § 360k further elaborates that preemption only applies if 
the FDA has specifically issued equivalent regulations or device specific 
regulations that conflict with state requirements and that those state 
requirements are “different from, or in addition to, the specific [FDA] 
requirements.”37 The express preemption clause is meant to avoid the 
conflict that would exist if states enforced requirements with respect to 
medical devices that clashed with the federal requirements set forth by 
the FDA. The preemption clause was also meant to address the tension 
created between the states’ interest in maintaining the health and welfare 
of its citizens and the FDA’s role as the gatekeeper for the medical 
                                                                                                             
 32 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 33 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)(quoting Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). 
 34 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 35 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). 
 36 The express preemption provision of the MDA provides that 
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in 
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) 
which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under 
this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness 
of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to 
the device under this chapter. 
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
 37 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2005). 
State or local requirements are preempted only when the [FDA] has 
established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific 
requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making 
any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device 
different from, or in addition to, the specific [FDA] requirements. 
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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device market. However, the boundaries of the express preemption 
clause remain to be tested, as the scope of the clause as applied to state 
common law tort claims is the subject of debate. 
A majority of circuit courts have found that state common law tort 
claims are preempted by the express preemption provision; however, the 
courts’ reasoning is splintered. 38 A minority of circuits have held that 
state common law tort claims are not preempted. Those courts have 
allowed such suits to proceed where a Class III medical device has 
caused injury. In the following section, this comment will detail each 
circuit court’s stance on the scope of the MDA’s express preemption 
provision. The Supreme Court’s decision, in Medtronic v. Lohr, and the 
Court’s recent decision, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, will be used to 
advocate the application of a new “parallel requirements” test to 
determine the scope of preemption in the context of the PMA approval 
process. It is important to employ a uniform approach to the scope of 
preemption and the ability of injured consumers to seek recourse in the 
legal system. The MDA does not provide a private right of action. Thus, 
consumers are left to seek legal action through state common law tort 
claims.39 The circuit split over whether state common law claims can 
survive against device manufacturers effectively leaves some consumers 
with a remedy in the legal system and most without. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Medtronic v. Lohr 
The Supreme Court’s precedent on federal preemption with respect 
to FDA regulation has been inconsistent at best and leaves a lack of 
guidance for future circuit court decisions on the matter. In Medtronic v. 
Lohr, the Supreme Court held that state common law tort claims were 
not preempted by the FDA’s approval of a medical device through the § 
510(k) process.40 The plaintiff in the case brought various state common 
law tort claims sounding in negligence and product liability as a result of 
injuries suffered from a pacemaker that was implanted in her chest.41 The 
pacemaker was considered a Class III medical device, which entered the 
market through the § 510(k) process.42 The § 510(k) process differs from 
the PMA approval process, because it is a determination that the product 
being approved, in this case the pacemaker, is substantially equivalent to 
a similar device on the market and therefore it is unnecessary to go 
                                                                                                             
 38 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
 39 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487. 
 40 Id. at 470. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 480. 
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through the more rigorous PMA process.43 Despite the difference in 
approval processes, the express preemption provision applied to the 
pacemaker and the Supreme Court analyzed the scope of its language 
with respect to the plaintiff’s state common law tort claim.44 
The Court first looked to the intent of Congress in enacting the 
MDA and noted that Congress did not intend to preclude all state 
common law claims.45 The Court stated, “when Congress enacted § 
360k, it was primarily concerned with the problem of specific, 
conflicting state statutes and regulations rather than the general duties 
enforced by common-law actions.”46 Congress did not intend to prevent 
persons injured by medical devices from seeking recourse in state 
courts.47 Where a state requirement parallels the federal requirement the 
Court held that there would be no preemption, as parallel requirements 
would not be considered “different from or in addition to.”48 The Court, 
in a plurality opinion, rejected the medical device manufacturer’s 
argument that the express preemption provision barred every state 
common law claim from being brought against them.49 The Court 
stressed that it was unlikely Congress meant to preempt state common 
law tort claims where the language of the preemption provision points to 
more specific “requirements,” such as state statutes or regulations.50 
However, the Court neglected to find that state common law claims 
would “never” constitute specific state requirements, leaving the debate 
open with respect to the limits of the preemption clause.51 
Justice Breyer issued a concurring opinion, which set forth the 
position that “requirements” in the express preemption provision of the 
MDA could very well include state common law tort claims.52 Justice 
Breyer focused on the effect of an adverse state court judgment and 
expressed how the state common law tort claim would be no different 
from a state regulation.53 The concurring opinion noted the difficulty in 
interpreting the express preemption provision in the MDA where the 
                                                                                                             
 43 Id. at 478. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 487. 
 46 Id. at 491. “The legislative history also confirms our understanding that 360(k) 
[sic] simply was not intended to pre-empt most, let alone all, general common-law duties 
enforced by damages actions.” Id. 
 47 Id. at 487. 
 48 Id. at 470. 
 49 Id. at 486. 
 50 Id. at 490-91. 
 51 Id. at 503. 
 52 Id. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 53 Id. 
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language is “highly ambiguous.”54 Despite Justice Breyer’s skeptical 
review of the preemption provision with respect to state common law tort 
claims, he ultimately found that plaintiff’s claims were not preempted 
due to the lack of specificity imposed on the device through the § 510(k) 
process.55 
Justice O’Connor issued an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. Justice O’Connor agreed with Justice Breyer that state 
common law claims resulting in damages would have the same effect as 
a device specific state regulation. However, Justice O’Connor voiced her 
disagreement with the interpretation that the MDA provision only 
preempts specific federal requirements and stressed that the focus should 
be whether the requirements are “different from, or in addition to” the 
federal requirements.56 Despite her argument for preempting state 
common law claims that compete with federal requirements, Justice 
O’Connor concurred in the judgment where the state common law tort 
claims were not effectively different from the minimal federal 
requirements imposed under the § 510(k) process.57 
The Court’s plurality decision in Medtronic has left the circuits 
without substantial guidance. The majority of circuit courts interpret 
Medtronic to find no preemption where a device has been approved 
under the § 510(k) process.58 However, the decision failed to address the 
preemption analysis where the medical device at issue has undergone the 
more extensive examination under the PMA process. The decision also 
failed to institute a clear test, which future courts could apply to the 
preemption issue. The decision in Medtronic led to disjointed opinions 
from the circuit courts. Since the decision in Medtronic, circuit courts 
have attempted to piece together various tests that would follow the 
language used by the Supreme Court. Without a clear path to follow, the 
circuit courts have split three different ways and the need for a uniform 
test becomes more apparent as time goes by. 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLITS—THREE CATEGORIES OF REASONING 
The decisions of the circuit courts of appeal can be divided into 
three categories, with a majority finding that the express preemption 
clause in the MDA defeats state common law tort claims. The first 
category encompasses those circuits that conclude that the requirements 
of state common law claims differ from those imposed by the PMA 
                                                                                                             
 54 Id. at 505. 
 55 Id. at 506-08. 
 56 Id. at 512 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 57 Id. at 513. 
 58 Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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process and, therefore, must be preempted according to the statute. These 
courts have looked to how a state law judgment would create a different 
requirement for manufacturers of medical devices than the one set forth 
by the PMA process. The second category consists of those circuits 
which have found state common law tort claims preempted by the PMA 
process because the process itself constitutes a specific federal 
requirement. These courts reason that the holding in Medtronic does not 
extend to devices approved under the PMA process due to the extensive 
nature of testing and scrutiny required, which conflicts with state 
common law claims. The third category of court decisions hold that the 
PMA approval process does not preempt state common law tort claims; 
these courts support claims brought against device manufacturers 
sounding in negligence and product liability. With slight variation, these 
courts reason that the PMA process is not a device specific control, 
lacking any requirement directed at the particular device. To further 
develop these categories, this comment will now summarize the different 
circuit court decisions per each category and provide the factual basis on 
which each case was decided. This summary will show the reader the 
variety of potential claims and the scope of preemption. 
A. Category I—Preemption Based on Different State Requirements 
1. The First Circuit 
The First Circuit’s pre-Medtronic decisions in King v. Collagen 
Corp.59 and Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc.60 held that federal law preempted 
state common law tort claims including negligence and breach of 
warranties against medical device manufacturers. In King, the plaintiff 
brought claims arising from an injury caused by Zyderm, an injection 
approved to treat skin imperfections and wrinkles as a Class III medical 
device.61 The plaintiff suffered a severe injury to her face due to the 
Zyderm injection.62 She then brought several state common law claims 
against the device manufacturer.63 The court held that all state common 
law claims were preempted because the cause of action against the 
manufacturer imposed a specific state requirement that is prohibited by 
21 U.S.C. § 360k.64 Although this case was decided prior to Medtronic, 
subsequent First Circuit cases have affirmed its holding finding that state 
                                                                                                             
 59 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 60 63 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 61 King, 983 F.2d at 1131. 
 62 Id. at 1132. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1135-36. 
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common law tort claims are preempted because they impose different 
and additional requirements than the federal requirement promulgated 
under the MDA.65 
Post-Medtronic, the district courts have questioned the First 
Circuit’s current position concerning preemption.66 In Haidak v. 
Collagen Corp., a plaintiff, with injuries and claims paralleling the 
plaintiff in King, brought a claim against the manufacturer of Zyderm.67 
The one difference between Haidak and King was that the injuries in 
King were an “unintended result of which both she and the FDA were 
unaware.”68 In analyzing the application of King to the issue of PMA 
approval preemption of state common law tort claims, the district court 
held that “[p]ost-[Medtronic], this court cannot conclude beyond 
peradventure of doubt that the First Circuit’s decision in King would 
necessarily be the same.”69 The court held that the manufacturer could 
not succeed at the summary judgment phase by arguing that the PMA 
process preempts any state law claims as a matter of law.70 While not 
deciding the issue of preemption, given the facts of the case, the court 
suggested that preemption would apply only where the FDA had enacted 
device specific requirements.71 The PMA process in itself did not 
preempt common law claims.72 Therefore, future state common law 
                                                                                                             
 65 Id. at 1131. 
 66 See Haidak v. Collagen Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 67 Id. at 25. 
 68 Id. at 34. The court explained: 
While King implies a broad preemptive sweep, it is apparent to the court 
that King is factually distinct from the instant matter. There, the plaintiff’s 
negligence claim, indeed all her claims, arose out of an unwanted 
autoimmune reaction to Zyderm. As the First Circuit made clear, the FDA 
was especially involved in the labeling process regarding the inclusion of 
contraindications regarding autoimmune reactions. The King plaintiff’s 
allegations derived from the fact that Defendant failed to reveal known 
dangerous propensities of Zyderm despite explicit FDA directives to do so. 
In the instant matter, the gravamen of [the p]laintiff’s claim is very different. 
Although [the p]laintiff advances a very generalized complaint-that 
Defendant was “careless and negligent in the design, manufacture, 
distribution, sale and/or conveyance of the product”—the core of her claim 
is that the Zyderm migrated from the injection site, an unintended result of 
which both she and the FDA were unaware. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 69 Id. at 29. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 29-33. The claim at issue in this case arose from use of a Collagen injection 
approved under the PMA process that was applied to the plaintiff’s eyes and nose.  Id.  
The Collagen caused injury by migrating throughout her body to form a mass in her 
lymph node.  Id.  The migration of the Collagen to another part of the body was a result 
that was not addressed or known by the FDA.  Id. The court explained: 
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claims against Class III device manufacturers could be brought against 
device manufacturers in the First Circuit where the FDA has failed to 
enact device specific requirements. 
2. The Second Circuit 
In Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., the Second Circuit found that 
state common law tort claims were requirements that would interfere 
with requirements that the PMA process imposed on device 
manufacturers.73 The court held that such state claims were preempted. 
This case concerned a “prosthetic device implanted in cataract patients to 
replace the natural lens of the eye.”74 The court analyzed the PMA 
process reviews and compared them to the claims brought by the 
plaintiff.75 The Second Circuit determined that, if the plaintiff were 
allowed to prevail on these claims, the judgment against the device 
manufacturer would constitute additional requirements different from 
those posed by the PMA process.76 Thus, the FDA’s determination that 
the device was safe for human use preempted those claims that directly 
conflicted with that determination.77 
The Class III medical device at issue in Becker was not approved 
by the PMA process at the time it was implanted in the plaintiff’s eye.78 
The device had an investigator device exemption from the PMA process 
and the plaintiff was part of a study to determine its safety and 
effectiveness.79 However, the court’s decision was not affected by the 
experimental nature of the device as “the [c]ourt stated that the state law 
claims were pre-empted whether or not the device was subject to the 
specific regulations, or the general regulations relating to an IDE.”80 The 
court concluded that its interpretation of the MDA’s express preemption 
                                                                                                             
Although the court is loathe to address [the p]laintiff’s claim of migration in 
any detail, it appears that the claim, as so framed, might be able to avoid the 
broad preemptive bar of the MDA. Nothing in the record to date suggests 
that the FDA enacted specific requirements regarding the standard of care 
necessary to obviate product migration. 
Id. at 34.   
 73 Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., 66 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 74 Id. at 19. 
 75 Id. at 20. 
 76 Id. Although the decision was made pre-Medtronic, the Second Circuit has not 
changed its ruling and the district courts have not provided any criticism. The state of 
such claims in light of Medtronic is subject to argument. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 19. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Berish v. Richards Med. Co., 937 F. Supp. 181, 183 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that 
the Medtronic decision does not conflict with the holding in Becker). 
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provision applied to state statutory law as well as common law.81 The 
Second Circuit aligns with the other circuits that consider state common 
law tort claims as different requirements, which conflict with the FDA 
and trigger preemption by federal law. 
3. The Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit in Duvall v. Bristol Myers-Squibb interpreted 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Medtronic and stated that “§ 360k(a) of 
the MDA preempts state-law causes of action to the extent that, if 
successful, they would impose requirements different from or additional 
to requirements specifically applicable to the particular device under the 
MDA.”82 The plaintiff in Duvall brought claims against a Class III 
device manufacturer for breach of warranty, defective design and failure 
to warn, among other state law claims.83  The plaintiff had been 
implanted with an inflatable penis prosthesis that was approved by the 
FDA through the § 510(k) process.84 The court found that the plaintiff’s 
state common law claims would have been preempted if the FDA had 
issued device specific requirements to the device at issue.85 In its 
holding, the court noted that the § 510(k) process did not constitute a 
federal device specific requirement because the device was only subject 
to general controls for approval.86 This case did not decide the issue of 
whether or not the PMA process would preempt state common law tort 
claims, but it showed that the Fourth Circuit would most likely have 
found the claims preempted because they were additional requirements 
with respect to the PMA process. 
In Woods v. Gliatech, the District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia decided that state common law tort claims were not preempted 
where the FDA issued a conditional PMA to a Class III medical device.87  
The plaintiff had suffered injuries as a result a Class III medical device 
applied as a gel to lessen scarring and pain after surgery.88 The plaintiff’s 
claims against the manufacturer included state common law tort claims 
for negligence, breach of warranty and fraud on the public.89 Aligning 
itself with the Eleventh Circuit, this court found that “the FDA’s review 
                                                                                                             
 81 Becker, 66 F.3d at 19. 
 82 Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 103 F.3d 324, 332 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 83 Id. at 326. 
 84 Id. at 328. Note that approval through the § 510(k) process means that a 
substantially similar device was preexistent in the marketplace at the time of application. 
 85 Id. at 332. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Woods v. Gliatech, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 802 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
 88 Id. at 804. 
 89 Id. at 805. 
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and approval of the PMA, by itself, imposes no ascertainable federal 
requirements.”90 Therefore, the court did not allow the defendant 
manufacturer of the medical device to use the conditional PMA approval 
as protection from the lawsuit.91 It is unclear how this broad holding will 
be applied, and, specifically, whether the Fourth Circuit will apply the 
same analysis to the completion of the PMA process, as opposed to only 
a condition approval.92 
4. The Fifth Circuit 
In Martin v. Medtronic, the Fifth Circuit held that § 360k(a) 
preempts state products liability claims when the Class III medical 
device manufacturer complies with the FDA’s PMA process.93 The 
plaintiffs’ claims against the Class III medical device manufacturer 
included product liability claims for negligence and breach of warranty.94 
The plaintiffs were implanted with pacemakers and suffered injuries 
allegedly from a defective lead wire in the device.95 The court held that 
Medtronic did not overrule its decision in Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 
because the holding in Stamps correctly found state tort claims 
preempted under the MDA.96 The court stated, “we can conclude only 
that general duties of care can generate specific requirements that 
                                                                                                             
 90 Id. at 808. The court further rejected the circuit court decisions finding that “the 
PMA approval process itself constitutes a specific federal requirement” rejecting views 
held by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Id. at 807. 
 91 Id. at 808-10 n.4. While holding that the conditional PMA approval was not a 
specific federal requirement preempting state law, the court gave further ammunition for 
its holding. Id.  The device manufacturer Gliatech had engaged in deceptive practices 
with respect to the reporting and submission of medical data about the use of its device to 
the FDA. Id. 
The FDA’s approval letter specifically stated: “Failure to comply with the 
conditions of approval invalidates this approval order. Gliatech 
subsequently pled guilty to submission of materially false and misleading 
data with respect to the U.S. study. Thus, even assuming the conditional 
PMA constitutes a preemptive requirement, the court finds that Gliatech’s 
failure to comply with the PMA conditions invalidated the FDA’s approval 
of ADCON-L.” 
Id. at 808 n.4 (internal citations omitted). 
 92 See Murphy v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 69 F. App’x. 140 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that state law claims, relating to failure to warn and the labeling of tampons, 
were preempted by the FDA’s specific approval of labeling requirements and the FDA’s 
consideration of risks involved with the product). 
 93 Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 94 Id. at 575. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 580. 
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conflict with specific FDA requirements” and supported a finding that 
the PMA process itself constituted a specific federal requirement.97 
Despite finding the plaintiffs’ claims preempted, the Fifth Circuit 
provided a possible avenue for relief for litigants attempting to sue a 
medical device manufacturer. The court, with reference to the Medtronic 
decision, stated that “common law duties that incorporate the PMA 
process, such as the general duty to take due care to comply with the 
PMA process in labeling or manufacturing, will never contain specific 
requirements that are additional to or different from federal 
requirements.”98 The court implied that it would allow a claim that 
encompassed aspects similar to those imposed by the PMA process. The 
scope of the general duty stated by the Fifth Circuit and the extent to 
which a court would entertain such claims seems unclear. Therefore, the 
Fifth Circuit provides for a possible private right of action against 
medical device manufacturers that do not comply with the PMA 
process.99 
                                                                                                             
 97 Id. at 582.  The court noted that 
[t]his reasoning is consistent with the majority opinion; while the general 
duty, standing on its own, is not a threat to federal requirements and is not 
developed specifically “with respect to” medical devices, the elements 
needed to prove a violation of that general duty may be very specifically 
tailored to the device, and the state court action may therefore threaten 
specific federal requirements. 
Id. 
 98 Id. at 583 n.8. Recognizing binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit, the court in 
Betterton v. Evans found that the plaintiff’s state law claims against a pacemaker 
manufacturer were preempted despite a slightly illogical holding. 351 F. Supp. 2d 529, 
536 (N.D. Miss. 2004). In its conclusion, the court expressed its discomfort with its 
holding: 
 The court notes its disdain for this mandatory conclusion given that 
“Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, in the words 
of the statute’s preamble, ‘to provide for the safety and effectiveness of 
medical devices intended for human use.’” The evidence presented in this 
case to date indicates that the subject pacemaker simply did not work. A 
pacemaker can hardly be said to be safe and effective when it not only does 
not work, but also requires subjecting a patient to the agony of opening and 
reopening his chest[,] because the pacemaker is malfunctioning and neither 
the pacemaker–company representative nor the surgeon implanting it can 
figure out how to make it work. In other words, the court must abide by the 
law which unfortunately disallows patients or their heirs a remedy when a 
FDA–approved Class III medical device malfunctions and ceases to be safe 
and effective. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 99 Martin, 254 F.3d at 583 (“In the context of the PMA process, we agree that state 
tort suits that allege, as the basis of their claim, that the approved FDA requirements have 
not been met are not preempted.”); see Haddock v. Mentor Tex., No. 3:03-CV-2311-B, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4975 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2005) (suggesting that plaintiffs, who 
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5. The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit in Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. followed the 
majority rule when it held that the PMA process imposed specific federal 
requirements on the medical device where the FDA had required 
additional warnings, and that a state common law tort claim would 
impose “specific state requirement[s] ‘different from, or in addition to’ 
specific federal requirements.”100 Bone cement is a Class III medical 
device.101 The plaintiff in this case brought products liability claims for 
injuries resulting from her occupational use of bone cement.102 As a 
nurse, the plaintiff was responsible for mixing the bone cement used in 
orthopedic surgeries.103 She claimed that the manufacturer’s inadequate 
labeling failed to warn her of the dangerous vapors, which result from 
mixing the cement.104 The court developed a three-step test to determine 
whether the PMA preempts the state common law claims.105 The court 
must first determine what federal requirement was imposed on the 
medical device manufacturer in getting the device on the market.106 
Second, the court must discern the state requirement that would be 
imposed on that manufacturer.107 In the third and final step, the court 
must “compare the two to determine whether they present conflicting 
obligations” on the device manufacturer.108  If so, the court will find the 
state claims preempted under § 360k.109 This approach looks at the 
specificity of both the federal requirement and the state requirement. 
Importantly, this decision did not imply that the PMA approval 
process would always constitute a specific federal requirement or that 
state common law tort claims would always be specific state 
requirements. The court’s three-step test provides a case-by-case 
evaluation of the device allegedly causing injury and the claims brought 
against the manufacturer. Additionally, the court distinguished its 
holding from those circuits that have not found preemption: 
                                                                                                             
show evidence that the manufacturer of the Class III device, failed to follow the PMA 
standards could avoid federal preemption). 
 100 Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. 273 F.3d 785, 799 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 
360k (2006)). 
 101 Id. at 789. 
 102 Id. at 787. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 799 (Bye, J., dissenting in part). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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Those circuit court decisions since [Medtronic] which have 
not found preemption in failure to warn cases were faced with 
circumstances different from those in this case. . . . In Goodlin v. 
Medtronic, Inc., a case in which the FDA had issued no statement 
or order of requirements beyond review and approval of the 
initial PMA, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that simple approval of 
the PMA application imposes no federal “requirements.” The 
Goodlin court implied, however, that it would find preemption in 
a case involving an “ascertainable requirement in an express 
FDA” order or regulation. That is what we have here, where the 
FDA has issued a series of specific mandates regarding the label 
for Simplex [bone cement]. Simplex has been subject to 
continuing and specific FDA regulation, beyond its initial 
approval through the PMA process.110 
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit’s position with respect to devices approved 
by the PMA process, without further regulation by the FDA, remains an 
open question. Given the language used by the Eighth Circuit, the court 
would be unlikely to find such claims preempted where the FDA gave 
the device only PMA approval. The Eighth Circuit would most likely 
draw the line where the FDA has subjected the device to additional 
modification or requirements after the PMA approval process. 
B. Category II—Preemption Based on the PMA Process 
1. The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit recently shifted its reasoning to hold that state 
common law tort claims were preempted by the MDA. In Horn v. 
Thoratec Corp., the plaintiff brought product liability claims against the 
device manufacturer of a “HeartMate” pump, a device that surgeons 
implant into patients to allow blood flow to certain areas of the heart.111 
The lower court applied a two-prong test to find that the PMA approval 
process constitutes a specific requirement of the FDA and preempts state 
common law claims.112 The court found that such state claims would be 
preempted if “1) the FDA has established specific federal requirements 
that are applicable to that particular device, and 2) the state claim is 
different from, or in addition to, the specific federal requirements.”113 
Applying this test, the court held that any judgment by a state court as to 
a specific product’s safety directly conflicts with the FDA’s 
                                                                                                             
 110 Id. at 795-96 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted). 
 111 Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 112 Id. at 165. 
 113 Id. 
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determination, through the PMA process, that the product was safe.114 
The lower court began and ended its analysis by finding the PMA 
approval process was a “specific federal requirement.”115 
However, the Third Circuit did not define what constitutes a 
“requirement” for preemption. The court engaged in a general discussion 
of the rigors of the PMA and the back and forth communication between 
the FDA and the manufacturer during the process.116  The court found 
that the PMA process was a federal requirement and held “the 
requirements imposed by the FDA upon the HeartMate when it was 
granted PMA approval are precisely ‘the sort of concerns regarding a 
specific device’ which the Supreme Court intimated would give rise to 
preemption under § 360k(a).”117 The court concluded that the PMA 
process “imposed mandatory conditions” on the medical device and 
equated it to a federal requirement.118 Additionally, the Third Circuit 
considered an amicus curiae brief, filed on behalf of the FDA, providing 
the agency’s opinion that the “PMA approval in this particular case 
requires preemption,” in which the Court found support for its holding.119 
In his dissent, Judge Fuentes expressed strong opposition to the 
majority’s reasoning in Horn.120 Judge Fuentes agreed that the PMA 
process was a specific federal requirement but he disagreed that all state 
common law tort claims were “specific requirements.”121 Judge Fuentes 
also rejected the majority’s reliance on the amicus curiae brief submitted 
by the FDA that urged a finding of preemption in this case.122 The dissent 
refers to Congressional purpose in enacting the MDA as protecting 
consumers from harmful medical devices and rejects the majority’s 
                                                                                                             
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 169-70. 
 117 Id. at 169. 
 118 Id. at 170. The analysis of what constitutes a federal requirement for purposes of 
preemption has varied greatly from circuit to circuit, giving rise to the different categories 
provided by this note. See Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1375-76 (11th Cir. 
1999). “The approval represents only a finding that the manufacturer’s proposal to 
market a device has reasonably assured the FDA of the device’s safety and effectiveness. 
. . . [T]he approval [does not, however] provide any indication of what (if any) specific 
substantive requirements the FDA may have applied to reach that result.”  Id. at 1375. 
Additionally, FDA authorization “is clearly specific to the device under review, but 
because the approval itself neither reveals nor imposes any ascertainable substantive 
prerequisite for approval that we could compare to a purportedly conflicting state 
requirement, the approval itself does not fit within section 360k(a)(1)’s demand for a 
specific federal requirement.” Id. at 1376. 
 119 Horn, 376 F.3d at 177. 
 120 Id. at 180 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 182 n.29. 
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conclusion that Congressional purpose was to balance the manufacturer’s 
need for innovation versus the consumer’s need for safety.123 With Judge 
Fuentes as the lone dissenter, the majority rule will stand strong in the 
Third Circuit, which finds preemption for most state common law tort 
claims.124 
2. The Sixth Circuit 
In Kemp v. Medtronic, the Sixth Circuit found that state common 
law product liability claims, fraud on the FDA, and state failure to warn 
claims were all preempted by the PMA process.125 The plaintiff brought 
common law negligence and product liability claims against a Class III 
device manufacturer for injuries sustained due to an allegedly defective 
wire in her pacemaker.126 The FDA approved the pacemaker at issue 
through the PMA process and thereafter subjected the device to a PMA 
supplement due to a modification of the materials used in its lead wire.127 
Two years before surgeons implanted the plaintiff with the device, the 
FDA recognized a “significant risk of failure” for the lead surrounding 
the wire and the device manufacturer issued a “Health Safety Alert” 
about the specific model pacemaker.128  Additionally, the court noted that 
“the FDA has never promulgated federal regulations regarding the 
manufacture of pacemaker leads.”129 
In rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Goodlin v. 
Medtronic, the court recognized the difficulty the respective courts of 
appeal have encountered while interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Medtronic.130 The court first found that the PMA process was a 
specific federal requirement and agreed with the device manufacturer 
                                                                                                             
 123 Id. at 185 (“As the [Medtronic] court observed, the purpose of the MDA was to 
protect consumers by ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. Contrary 
to . . . assertions, protection of the medical device industry from excessive regulation was 
a minimal concern.” (citations omitted)). 
 124 The Third Circuit’s scope of the FDA’s preemption clause appears to be the 
broadest of all of the circuit court decisions in that it finds that the PMA process is a 
specific federal requirement, regardless of the device. Id. at 169 (majority opinion). The 
Third Circuit also holds that state tort claims relating to the device are additional 
requirements, regardless of the claim. Id. Therefore, regardless of the device regulated or 
the claim proposed against it, the Third Circuit would most likely find all claims 
preempted by the FDA’s PMA approval. 
 125 Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 237 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 126 Id. at 219. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 226. 
 130 Id. at 224 (“The various courts of appeals that have confronted issues of 
preemption arising under the MDA have struggled mightily with [Medtronic’s] language 
in the effort to discern its holding.”). 
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that “it is the totality of the design, manufacturing processes, and 
labeling–when coupled with the prohibition against modifying them–that 
represents the specific federal requirement.”131 The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that a verdict against the device manufacturer would 
constitute a “requirement different from and in addition to those 
established by the FDA”; therefore, the plaintiff’s state law tort claims 
were specific state requirements.132 The finding that the PMA process 
constitutes a device specific requirement that conflicts with state law 
claims has been upheld in later Sixth Circuit decisions.133 
3. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit most recently joined the majority precedent. In 
McMullen v. Medtronic, the Seventh Circuit found that the specific 
federal requirements imposed by the FDA preempted state law tort 
claims.134 The plaintiff brought state common law claims for failure to 
warn against a Class III device manufacturer because of injuries he 
suffered from the implantation of a tremor control device in his brain.135 
The FDA approved the Class III device, as well as the additional specific 
warnings displayed on the device, through the PMA process.136 The 
plaintiff premised a failure to warn claim on the information the 
manufacturer issued regarding new risks of injury or death through the 
use of the device.137 The plaintiff claimed that, although the device 
manufacturer had issued a warning regarding a new risk of injury, the 
warning came too late to avoid his injury.138 
                                                                                                             
 131 Id. at 228. 
 132 Id. at 230. The concurring opinion notes the possibility of a claim for failure to 
comply with the federal requirements. Id. Judge Moore, citing to the majority opinion, 
agreed that 
“a claim premised on the violation of FDA requirements 
established for a Class III device through the PMA process is 
not automatically preempted.” Thus as the majority recognizes, 
a claim for negligence per se premised on the absence of a 
platinum sputter barrier as required by the FDA approval 
would not be preempted because the state claim would not 
impose requirements different from or additional to the federal 
requirements. 
Id. at 237 (Moore, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 133 See Cupek v. Medtronic, 405 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding to its previous 
stance on preemption despite an attempt by the plaintiffs from Kemp v. Medtronic to 
bring suit again for modified claims against the medical device manufacturer); see also 
Moore v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N. D. Ohio 2004). 
 134 McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 135 Id. at 484. 
 136 Id. at 485. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
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Relying on its previous decision in Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., the 
court found that the PMA process is a specific federal requirement, 
which preempted the plaintiff’s claims.139 The court held that the 
warnings provided with a device were approved by the FDA and that a 
state law failure to warn claim directly conflicts with the specific federal 
requirement.140 Although the Mitchell Court acknowledged its significant 
difficulty interpreting the Supreme Court’s Medtronic decision and the 
scope of the FDA requirements,141 the Seventh Circuit considered the 
PMA process to be a specific federal requirement preempting state 
common law claims. The Seventh Circuit’s difficulty analyzing the 
preemption issue shows the problem presented to all circuit courts. 
C. Category III—Common Law Claims Are Not Preempted 
1. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit, in Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., held that the 
PMA approval process, by itself, is not a “requirement” with respect to a 
specific device.142 The plaintiff brought common law claims of 
negligence and product liability against a device manufacturer for 
injuries sustained from an injection of collagen.143 The court reversed the 
summary judgment order and held that the common law claims were not 
                                                                                                             
 139 Id. at 490. 
 140 Id. at 488 (“If Medtronic believed that a warning different from the one approved 
by the FDA was appropriate in light of an adverse event, it was required to seek FDA 
approval of any proposed changes. These are relevant federal requirements limiting [the 
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C.F.R. § 814.39(a)). 
 141 The court stated: 
The implementing regulation for the FDA is likewise imprecise and fails to 
address squarely the issue of preemption by common law causes of action. 
Lastly, although we have an obligation to be absolutely faithful to the 
holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States, the holding in 
Medtronic contains several ambiguities that impair our ability to perceive 
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 The ambiguity central to our task is the tension between the holding of 
the Court embodied in the text immediately above and Justice Breyer’s 
belief, essential to the formation of a majority, that at least some state-based 
causes of action would be preempted by the MDA. Like the majority of 
courts that already have had to deal with this quandary, we believe that the 
Medtronic disposition must be read as acknowledging that at least some 
state-based common law causes of action must be considered ‘requirements’ 
as that term is employed in the MDA. 
Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 142 Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled in part by 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 143 Id. at 1454. 
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preempted by the PMA process where the FDA had not issued a device 
specific requirement.144 The court explained: 
All Class III devices are required to obtain pre-market approval 
before being sold in interstate commerce. The fact that the pre-
market approval process involves specific requirements, must not 
be confused with the pre-market approval requirement itself 
acting as a specific requirement. The result of holding that the 
pre-market approval process is a “specific requirement applicable 
to a particular device” is the preemption of claims which, if 
barred, leave injured plaintiffs without any remedy in state or 
federal court.145 
The court further expressed its disbelief that this preemption clause 
would effectively bar all state common law tort claims, stating “‘[i]t is 
difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all 
means of recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.’”146 
However, the court in Papike v. Tambrands, Inc. limited the 
holding in Kennedy: “[t]o the extent [the court] concluded in Kennedy 
that the MDA cannot preempt any state common-law causes of action, 
the conclusion cannot survive in light of the concurring and dissenting 
opinions in Medtronic.”147 The plaintiff, in Papike, brought common law 
claims against a device manufacturer arising from injuries caused by her 
use of tampons.148 Tampons are Class II medical devices and 
manufacturers of tampons must comply with specific labeling 
requirements.149 The FDA requires specific content in warning labels due 
to the risk of Toxic Shock Syndrome to women who use Tampons; such 
requirements are codified in 21 C.F.R. § 801.430 (2006).150 In Papike v. 
Tambrands, Inc., the court held that the FDA regulations specific to the 
device at issue preempted state law failure to warn claims.151 
It is unclear to what extent, if at all, the Ninth Circuit would find 
preemption where a Class III medical device is subject only to the PMA 
process. Papike is an easily distinguishable case, where the product at 
issue was subject to very specific content based warnings and where the 
plaintiff’s claims were based on inadequate warnings.152 However, the 
district court in Clement v. Kaiser Foundation read the court’s decision 
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 145 Id. at 1459 (internal citations omitted). 
 146 Id. at 1456 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). 
 147 Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 148 Id. at 738. 
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 150 Id. at 743. 
 151 Id. at 738. 
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in Papike to hold that the PMA process in itself will constitute a specific 
requirement.153 The court stated that the “Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Papike supports the conclusion that the MDA would preempt some tort 
claims against the particular devices at issue in this case.”154 
2. The Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit in Oja v. Howmedica held that the FDA approval 
of a device is not, standing alone, a specific federal requirement.155 In 
this case, the plaintiff brought a negligent failure to warn and products 
liability action against Howmedica for injuries related to an artificial hip 
implant, a Class II medical device that was marketed under the § 510(k) 
process.156 The hip implant was also approved under an IDE exception 
for a specific type of use and ultimately received a conditional PMA 
approval for such use.157 Although the issue did not involve preemption 
of a Class III device specifically approved under the PMA process, the 
Tenth Circuit provided instructive language as to how it would rule in a 
Class III case.158 
From the Supreme Court’s Medtronic decision, the Tenth Circuit 
discerned a two prong test for MDA preemption issues.159 The court 
found that Medtronic required both a federal requirement and a state 
requirement aimed at regulating a specific device.160 The first prong 
requires a determination that the FDA imposed a specific federal 
requirement applicable to the medical device.161 The second prong asks 
whether there are any general state common law requirements 
specifically developed ‘with respect to’ medical devices imposed by a 
claim.162 Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court determined 
that the FDA made labeling demands of the hip implant’s 
manufacturer.163 The FDA specifically prohibited the manufacturer from 
                                                                                                             
 153 Clement v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. CV04-704 WJR (MCx), 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26414 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2004). 
 154 Id. at *16. 
 155 Oja v. Howmedica, 111 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 156 Id. at 784-87. The FDA’s final rule determined that the device was class II and 
stated that the “classification as a class III device was ‘not necessary to provide 
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.’” Id. at 787 (citing 21 
C.F.R. § 860.93 (2005)). 
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 158 Id. at 788. 
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labeling its product for non-cement use.164 The court held that the 
labeling mandate constituted a federal requirement in satisfaction of the 
first prong.165 
However, the court determined that the state law claim for failure to 
warn was “not specifically developed ‘with respect to’ medical devices”; 
therefore, it failed the second prong.166 The court explained that a claim 
for failure to warn cannot be specific to a device where it is universally 
applied to all device manufacturers for all devices.167 The manufacturer’s 
duty to warn is not device specific so as to conflict with the federal 
requirements of safety.168 Thus, the court concluded that the MDA did 
not preempt the state common law claim of negligent failure to warn.169 
Although the court in Howmedica did not decide or discuss whether 
the PMA process would constitute a federal requirement, it appears that 
they would not follow the majority rule. In the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, 
the court examined whether the FDA had imposed specific requirements 
or restrictions on the device, as opposed to whether the process under 
either the § 510(k) or the IDE exception were requirements standing 
alone.170 In Howmedica, the FDA had imposed a specific requirement, 
which prohibited the manufacturer from labeling or promoting a specific 
use of the device.171 The Seventh Circuit, in evaluating the Howmedica 
decision, stated that unlike the majority of the circuits, “[i]t appears that 
the Tenth Circuit would hold . . . that generic common law causes of 
action do not meet this test because, when stated without application to a 
particular product, they cannot be said to have been developed ‘in 
relation to’ the medical device in question.”172 
3. The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Goodlin v. Medtronic, found that the PMA 
approval process is not a specific federal requirement and state common 
law tort claims are not preempted.173 In Goodlin, the Class III medical 
device at issue was a pacemaker approved by the FDA through the PMA 
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 167 Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996)). 
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 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 789. 
 172 Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 913 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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approval process.174 The plaintiff brought claims against the device 
manufacturer for negligent design and product liability for injuries 
resulting from implantation and removal of a pacemaker.175 The court 
“d[id] not believe that requirements applicable to all devices that receive 
the FDA’s approval via the PMA process satisfy the [Supreme] Court’s 
demand for a specific requirement that applies to a particular device.”176 
The court began its analysis by reviewing the extensive measures 
undertaken by the device manufacturer in order to complete the PMA 
approval process, which spanned over a period of seven years.177 The 
court distinguished the Supreme Court’s holding in Medtronic due to the 
different approval processes and did not find the Medtronic decision 
controlling.178 The Goodlin Court did, however, apply the Supreme 
Court’s test for determining preemption.179 The Goodlin Court stated that 
preemption of a state common law claim requires the “(1) the imposition 
of a specific federal requirement that (2) applied to a particular device 
and (3) focused on the safety and effectiveness of the device.”180 
According to the Eleventh Circuit, the relevant inquiry boils down to 
whether the PMA process is a specific federal requirement regarding the 
safety of a specific device.181 
The Eleventh Circuit looked to the dictionary definition of 
“requirement” as well as the Congressional intent behind the MDA to 
decide whether the PMA process was a federal requirement. The court 
found that the PMA process did not “require” anything specific of the 
                                                                                                             
 174 Id. at 1368. The pacemaker at issue in this case was slightly different than the 
pacemaker at issue in Medtronic, and it was approved by the PMA process and not the § 
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facts presented in Kemp v. Medtronic, 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 175 Id. at 1369. 
 176 Id. at 1377 (citing Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 
1995), overruled in part by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)). 
 177 Id. at 1370. 
 178 Specifically, the court held: 
Despite the striking superficial similarity of the cases, the Supreme Court’s 
disposition of [Medtronic] provides little more than a rudimentary analytical 
framework to guide our resolution of Medtronic’s preemption claims in this 
case because [Medtronic] involved the 510k [sic] process rather than the 
PMA process, and because the Court fractured in an all but irreconcilable 
manner over the extent to which section 360k(a) would ever preempt a 
general state common law tort claim. 
Id. at 1371 (citing Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 179 Id. at 1372. 
 180 Id. (citing Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 492-94 (1996)). 
 181 Id. This test is the opposite of the inquiry by the first category of circuits who look 
to whether the state common law tort claim constitutes a different requirement, not 
whether the PMA approval process is a requirement. 
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manufacturer in relation to its device.182 The PMA process applied to all 
devices and the court stated that the process was not a “specific 
requirement that applies to a particular device.”183 The court also found 
that Congress’s intent behind the MDA would be thwarted by allowing 
state law claims to be preempted.184 The court noted that as Congress 
enacted the MDA to protect consumers from unregulated medical 
devices, it does not follow that Congress would, at the same time, 
preclude recourse for injured consumers.185 Therefore, the Eleventh 
Circuit refused to find that the PMA process preempted state common 
law claims.186 In conclusion, the court stated, “the FDA’s approval of a 
medical device pursuant to the PMA process, standing alone, imposes no 
specific federal requirement applicable to a particular device and, 
therefore, has no preemptive effect under section 360k(a) of the 
MDA.”187 
Concluding with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Goodlin, the 
disparity that plagues the circuit courts regarding the application of the 
express preemption clause of 360k(a) is obvious. Since the Supreme 
Court in Medtronic failed to provide a clear path to follow, the courts 
have applied disjointed tests to varying facts. The three categories of 
reasoning are gross categories at best, with some circuits deviating from 
the lines placed by this comment. However, the disorganized reasoning 
and the split among the circuits is critical; the decisions affect the rights 
of injured consumers throughout the nation. The scope of preemption in 
this context remains to be answered by the Supreme Court. However, the 
recent decision in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences provides insight into the 
proper test to be applied to the preemption issue.188 
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1995), overruled in part by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)). 
 184 Id. at 1378. 
 185 Id. at 1377-78. 
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 186 Id. at 1382. 
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 188 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
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III. THE BATES DECISION AND THE “PARALLEL REQUIREMENTS” TEST 
The Supreme Court recently decided an issue of federal preemption 
in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences.189 The decision instructs on the issue left 
undecided by Medtronic: whether the FDA’s premarket approval process 
preempts state common law tort claims. The issue of preemption in Bates 
was whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(“FIFRA”) preempted state common law tort claims. The express 
preemption provision in the FIFRA statute states that “[s]uch State shall 
not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or 
packaging in addition to or different from those required under this 
subchapter.”190 This language mirrors the MDA’s express preemption 
clause.191 Since both clauses preempt state “requirements,” the Supreme 
Court’s discussion should guide future interpretations of the MDA’s 
express preemption clause. 
Texas peanut farmers suffered the harm at issue in Bates after using 
the pesticide “Strongarm” on their crops.192 The peanut farmers alleged 
the pesticide caused extensive crop damage.193 Dow, the company that 
made and sold the pesticide, had a conditional registration from the EPA, 
which enabled it to market and sell the pesticide to the peanut farmers 
shortly before the planting season.194 The farmers alleged that Dow failed 
to include a warning on Strongarm regarding the damage to peanuts 
grown in soil with a pH higher than 7.0.195 Although Dow knew that 
Strongarm caused such crop damage when used at certain pH levels, the 
label made no such claim.196 In fact, the label stated, “Use of Strongarm 
is recommended in all areas where peanuts are grown”; farmers who 
used Strongarm in accordance with the recommendation experienced 
extensive damage to their peanut crops because the pH levels were 7.2 
and higher.197 The farmers sued Dow claiming negligence, strict liability, 
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 190 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006). 
 191 The MDA provides: 
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“fraud, breach of warranty and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade 
Practices-Consumer Protection Act.”198 Dow defended by claiming that 
the farmers’ suit was preempted by the express preemption provision of 
the FIFRA.199 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s determination that the express preemption clause in the FIFRA 
preempted the farmers’ state law claims.200 The Fifth Circuit analyzed 
the express preemption clause in the FIFRA in a manner similar to the 
analyses applied by circuit courts in Category I, which consider state 
actions to be requirements contrary to the MDA express preemption 
provision.201 The Fifth Circuit concluded that “[f]or a state to create a 
labeling requirement by authorizing a claim linked to the specifications 
of a label, even where the EPA has elected not to impose such labeling 
requirements, would clearly be to impose a requirement ‘in addition to or 
different from those’ required under FIFRA.”202  The Fifth Circuit came 
to this conclusion despite its acknowledgement that the EPA does not 
impose product specific labeling requirements regarding the 
effectiveness of the product registered under FIFRA.203 
The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari and reversed the Fifth 
Circuit.204 The Supreme Court found that preemption did not apply to the 
farmers’ state common law claims.205 Although the Fifth Circuit 
followed the majority of its sister circuits, the Supreme Court noted that 
the reasoning was incorrect.206 The Court began its analysis of the 
express preemption clause with a history of the FIFRA and the intent 
behind the statute,207 which was similar to the analysis the Court applied 
to the MDA in Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr.208 
The Supreme Court first noted that the preemption clause in the 
FIFRA only applied to state “requirements.”209 The Court explicitly 
stated that “[a]n occurrence that merely motivates an optional decision 
does not qualify as a requirement.”210 In defining requirement in terms of 
what it is not, the court stated that the “[c]ourt of [a]ppeals was therefore 
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quite wrong when it assumed that any event, such as a jury verdict, that 
might ‘induce’ a pesticide manufacturer to change its label should be 
viewed as a requirement.”211 Therefore, the Court stuck down the 
“effects-based” definition of requirement and explained that “[a] 
requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury 
verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a 
requirement.”212 The Court determined that, while a requirement is not a 
jury verdict alone, the definition could still “reach[] beyond positive 
enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace common-law 
duties.”213 
Also important to the analysis, the court found that the statute only 
preempts state law claims that are “in addition to or different from” the 
requirements under the FIFRA.214 The Court concluded, “a state-law 
labeling requirement is not pre-empted by [the statute] if it is equivalent 
to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding provisions.”215 The 
Court then went on to find support in its definition of requirement and 
the scope of preemption from its previous decision in Medtronic, which 
it clearly interpreted as creating a “parallel requirements” approach to 
preemption.216 The Court referred to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Medtronic, which stated “[s]ection 360k does not preclude States from 
imposing different or additional remedies, but only different or additional 
requirements.”217 According to the Court, this provided support for the 
principle that state law remedies could be provided to injured consumers 
where the federal law does not allow for such remedy.218 
The Supreme Court also used Medtronic to justify its holding that 
FIFRA does not preempt state law tort claims where they parallel to 
federal requirements. The Court explained: 
“Even if it may be necessary as a matter of Florida law to prove 
that those violations were the result of negligent conduct, or that 
they created an unreasonable hazard for users of the product, 
such additional elements of the state-law cause of action would 
make the state requirements narrower, not broader, than the 
federal requirement. While such a narrower requirement might be 
‘different from’ the federal rules in a literal sense, such a 
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difference would surely provide a strange reason for finding pre-
emption of a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule.”219 
The Court further emphasized “that a state-law labeling requirement 
must in fact be equivalent to a requirement under FIFRA in order to 
survive pre-emption.”220 The parallel requirements holding in Bates 
should be applied to preemption under the MDA; the relevant inquiry 
should become whether state common law tort claims equate to the 
federal requirements of safety imposed by the PMA process. 
A. Applying Bates to the Express Preemption Clause 
Although the two statutes are substantively different, the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the FIFRA’s express preemption clause is 
instructive as to the future interpretation of preemption under the PMA 
process. The language utilized by the two statutes is nearly identical and 
the Supreme Court looked to its own decision in Medtronic for the 
definition of “requirement.” The Supreme Court’s decision in Bates 
could allow state common law tort claims against device manufacturers 
where the claims parallel federal requirements. The PMA process itself is 
not a specific federal requirement under this analysis, because it is the 
guarantee of safety that the state law claims should be compared with. 
The PMA process is meant to ensure the safety and effectiveness of 
medical devices and most state common law tort claims parallel the 
requirement of safety. Claims that parallel the interests promoted by 
PMA approval should be allowed to go forward in state courts. 
Preemption should only apply where state common law claims ask for 
something different than was required in the PMA process. The circuit 
courts in Category I and Category II should reevaluate their positions on 
preemption.221 The Court’s language in Bates is very clear; it advocated 
an interpretation of the term “requirement” that allows for state common 
law tort claims where the federal requirements are also in the interest of 
safety.222 The Court explained that “we would nevertheless have a duty 
to accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption. ‘[B]ecause the States 
are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long 
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of 
action.’”223 
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Bates also provided examples of what Congress most likely 
intended when it drafted the preemption clause to prohibit additional or 
different state requirements. The court explained: 
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments suggests that 
Congress had conflicting state labeling regulations in mind when 
crafting § 136v(b) [the FIFRA preemption clause]. As one 
industry representative testified: “Some States might want the 
word ‘flammable,’ some ‘inflammable.’ . . . Some States might 
want red lettering; others orange, another yellow, and so forth. 
We ask this committee, therefore, to recognize, as the Congress 
has in a number of similar regulatory statutes, the industry’s need 
for uniformity by providing for this in the act.”. . . By contrast, 
the lengthy legislative history is barren of any indication that 
Congress meant to abrogate most of the common-law duties long 
owed by pesticide manufacturers.224  
This language indicates that Congress intended to preempt state specific 
requirements that would effectively result in conflicting interstate 
conditions and increased burdens on manufacturers. In the medical 
device context, the courts should apply the same analysis to allow claims 
that effect parallel requirements. It is likely that when Congress chose the 
term “requirement” it meant a requirement to be something specific 
about a device that differed from state to state, so as to ensure uniform 
device performance as well as to avoid overburdening device 
manufacturers. It does not follow that Congress intended to suspend state 
law claims sounding in negligence and product liability where medical 
devices malfunction and cause harm to consumers. The requirements 
imposed by state common law tort claims would be in concurrence with 
the intent of the MDA and the purview of the FDA’s regulation of the 
devices so long as the common law tort claims relate to safety. Applying 
the “parallel requirements” test to MDA preemption issues would 
effectively allow most state common law tort claims and provide 
consumers the necessary recourse in the law that Congress intended. 
Although the Bates Court did not address the PMA process, the 
decision provides ammunition for opponents of preemption under the 
MDA. Opponents of preemption can cite to Bates and show how the 
holding allows state common law tort claims, which are similar to the 
general requirements imposed by the PMA process. Applying this 
analysis, opponents of preemption could show that state common law 
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claims are merely different remedies, which are not precluded as 
requirements under section 360k.225 
B. The Appropriate Legal Standard 
With Bates as ammunition and the split amongs the circuits, the 
stage is set for change. Some persons injured by defective Class III 
medical devices can seek recourse in the law, while most cannot. The 
Supreme Court must step in, because, unfortunately, it appears that the 
circuits will remain divided. The meaning of the term “requirement” has 
been debated throughout numerous court opinions. Even the courts that 
align themselves in outcome are not uniform in the test they apply. The 
appropriate legal standard should be the “parallel requirements” test. The 
Bates decision should provide clarity to the preemption analysis and 
courts should find that state common law claims are not preempted 
where the FDA has failed to issue device specific requirements. 
This debate has become one of judicial legislation. The circuit 
courts have tried to determine the scope of a statute’s express preemption 
clause armed with an ambiguous Supreme Court decision that has 
provided little guidance. Where the legislature has been unclear as to the 
scope of a statute’s coverage regarding preemption, judicial legislation 
should be avoided. The Supreme Court recognized an obligation to avoid 
judicial legislation where it is properly “left to Congress the task of 
drafting a narrower statute.”226 Additionally, the Supreme Court stated, in 
Burns v. United States, that “[a]lthough ‘we construe statutes, where 
possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof,’ it is not 
our practice to supplement their provisions simply because we think that 
some statutory provision might usefully do further duty than Congress 
has assigned to it.”227 Unlike judicial legislation, which supplements a 
statute’s original intent, the Legislature has the power to change the 
wording of a statute to best represent its intent. 
Concerns regarding the separation of powers are abundant where 
circuit courts make inconsistent decisions affecting private litigants’ 
rights. If Congress feels that state common law tort claims cause 
manufacturers harm, then it is within Congress’s power to amend the 
statute to specifically exclude such actions. The Ninth Circuit in Kennedy 
v. Collagen stated that “[t]he federal law requiring the pre-market 
approval of Class III devices was not enacted in order to free 
                                                                                                             
 225 Id. at 448 (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
 226 United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995). 
 227 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 145 (1991) (citing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n. v. Solimino, 499 U.S. 946 (1991)). 
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manufacturers from the everyday burdens of the marketplace after they 
are permitted to enter it.”228 Therefore, finding manufacturers immune 
from state common law tort claims is in direct contravention to the intent 
of Congress in enacting the MDA. 
Forum shopping, due to the advantageous positions held by patients 
injured within a jurisdiction that allows state common law tort claims 
against Class III medical device manufacturers even where they are 
approved under a PMA process, is also a concern. Unfortunately, most 
persons injured by medical devices are not circuit court judges, lawyers, 
device manufacturers or members of the FDA. Rather, they are injured 
consumers who would not know to check whether the medical device 
they are using was approved under the § 510(k) process or the PMA 
process. Consumers expect that, if they are injured by a device through 
no fault of their own, they have recourse for their suffering through the 
legal system. If the goal behind enacting the MDA was protecting 
persons injured by medical devices, taking away the right to sue for these 
injuries is unfair. 
Allowing state common law tort claims would relieve some of the 
burden placed on the FDA as the ultimate arbitrator of what is safe and 
good.229 The FDA is the ultimate gatekeeper of what medical devices 
enter the market. In addition, the FDA takes the pressure off the 
manufacturer by making sure the product is safe. The public relies on the 
FDA for its critical determination that a medical device is safe for use. 
Recently, the FDA has come under major fire with regards to its 
handling of medical devices and the safety it promises.230  Failing to give 
the injured a right to compensation in the legal system is manifestly 
unjust. The FDA’s approval of a device is a necessary and important step 
in achieving the goal of safety for consumers, but the legal system should 
step in where the FDA fails to provide recourse for the injured. 
                                                                                                             
 228 Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled in part 
by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (“Premarket approval is supposed to 
benefit consumers, not create a rose garden, free from liability, for manufacturers. Courts 
which have held to the contrary have done so in contravention of the FDA’s regulations 
and statement concerning the preemptive scope of the MDA.”). 
 229 For an interesting discussion on a different problem related to the FDA’s 
regulation of medical devices stemming from its role as the primary gatekeeper of market 
access, see Noel D. Campbell, Replace FDA Regulation of Medical Devices with Third-
Party Certification, No. 288, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS, Nov. 12, 1997, 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-288.pdf. 
 230 See Barry Meier, U.S. Regulators Criticized on Oversight of Heart Devices, N.Y. 
TIMES, September 16, 2004. 
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CONCLUSION 
Finding state common law tort claims preempted by the FDA’s 
premarket approval of a Class III medical device would render injured 
consumers without the appropriate recourse in the law. “[T]he MDA 
provides no federal means by which injured plaintiffs can pursue legal 
remedies against the manufacturers of defective medical devices.”231 By 
allowing such claims to proceed against device manufacturers, in certain 
cases, the states would be allowing “remedies” rather than imposing 
“requirements.” The “parallel requirements” test provides the appropriate 
analysis by which courts can uniformly approach a growing problem. 
Additionally, tort law claims generally relate to the safety of the device 
and parallel the federal safety standards. The Supreme Court decision in 
Bates should be combined with the holding in Medtronic to create a more 
permissive scheme for allowing common law claims where the medical 
device is approved by the PMA process and not subject to any specific 
requirements. 
Furthermore, allowing state common law claims into court would 
not be the end-all for device manufacturers. The success of such common 
law tort claims would be questionable because the FDA’s approval 
should naturally create a presumption of safety that the plaintiff would 
have to overcome. The issue is getting such claims into court and 
allowing injured consumers a right of action. By allowing state law 
claims, the states would not be an additional gate through which the 
device manufacturer must pass; the FDA will retain its primary role as a 
gatekeeper. However, once allowed through that gate by the FDA, the 
medical device manufacturers should not be able to roam free by gaining 
substantial immunity from suit because their devices have been approved 
by the PMA process. In light of the split among the circuit courts and the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Medtronic and Bates, state common law 
claims should not be preempted where they parallel federal requirements. 
Injured consumers should be allowed to bring claims against medical 
device manufacturers. The ultimate goal of the FDA’s role in medical 
device regulation should be safety of the patient. Allowing state common 
law claims would support that goal. 
                                                                                                             
 231 Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1379 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996)) (“Reading the PMA process to 
impose specific federal requirements that enjoy preemptive effect under section 360k, 
therefore, would deprive all persons suffering injury as a result of a defective device--the 
very class of persons that Congress intended to protect by enacting the MDA—of ‘most, 
if not all relief.’”). 
